Skip to main content

Blessing in disguise or a menace: on India pulling out of RCEP trade deal

Amid rising concerns over increasing China’s influence in the Asia Pacific region, India’s decision to withdraw from Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) over “inadequate” protection against surges in imports, particularly from China and various unresolved “outstanding issues” looks wise in the present scenario. However, this protectionist mind-set is unsustainable in long run and India must do away with its defensive attitude and instead, work on export promotion strategies and creating globally competitive sectors.

Trade blocs are believed to have substantial “trade creation” effects by removing trade barriers and enabling free trade between participating countries. The member nations in such free trade agreements (FTAs) benefit through greater economic integration, lower tariffs, better trading opportunities, increased exports, economies of scale, higher competition and improved choice with lower prices for customers. Such pacts facilitate trade by letting companies to export anywhere within the bloc without meeting separate requirements of each country.  Some of the famous trade blocs include European Union, NAFTA, ASEAN Free trade area, SAFTA, Mercosur, CECA, CEPA and recently formed RCEP.

RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) Agreement was first proposed at the 19th ASEAN meet in November 2011 with an aim to create a consolidated market for the 10 ASEAN member countries and their six FTA trade partners. After nine years of negotiations, finally, 15 Asia-Pacific nations signed RCEP agreement in Nov 2020, covering over a third of world’s population and accounting for a combined GDP of $26.2 trillion (30% of the global GDP); thus creating one of the world’s largest trading blocs. However, India opted to pull out of this trade agreement that was signed on 15 November at 37th “online” Asian Summit hosted virtually by  Vietnam, among 10 ASEAN members — Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, and their five FTA partners — Australia, China, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand.

It was last year in Nov, 2019, at the Third RCEP Summit, in Thailand, when Prime Minister announced India’s decision to not be part of the trade bloc after member nation’s refusal to accede to its requests on providing safeguards to various sectors. Concerns were expressed by various stakeholders over adverse implications of import liberalisation if India joins RCEP. RCEP members want 92% of India’s goods tariff-free over the next 15 years. Most participating countries wanted India to slash existing tariffs on up to 90% of all goods. Unsatisfactory negotiations over growing trade deficits with China and various “outstanding issues” are the major reasons for pulling out of the trade bloc.

Why did India opt out of RCEP- Concerns over “unsustainable” trade deficits?

India runs a massive trade deficit with RCEP countries, particularly with China. In 2019 itself, India registered a bilateral trade deficit at $105 billion with 11 out of the 16 RCEP countries, out of which China alone accounted for around $50 billion. According to a paper published by NITI Aayog in 2017, India’s past experience with other FTAs has not been a very pleasant one and India has registered a bilateral trade deficit with most of the member countries of RCEP. The paper clearly shows that post FTA with ASEAN, Japan and South Korea, India’s trade has remained skewed with imports rising faster than exports, i.e. while exports to RCEP countries account for just 15% of India’s total exports, imports from RCEP countries make up 35% of the country’s total imports.

Unresolved “outstanding issues”

Weaknesses in agriculture and diary sector

Despite being a fundamentally open economy, India uses tariffs to protect their farmers and has always batted for adequate protection for agriculture at various international trade platforms. The dominance of small and marginal farmers in the agricultural sector and their incapacity to compete with global agricultural firms is the primary reason behind government excluding agriculture from import liberalisation.

In RCEP trade bloc, India faces stiff competition from Australia which has large exports in wheat and sugar, two of the most important agri-export commodities for India too. It’s worth noting that Australia has also lodged complaint against India in WTO, alleging that India's continued sugar subsidies to farmers have led to a "glut" and "depressed" global prices. Three other RCEP participating countries, China, Indonesia and Thailand, have joined the dispute as third parties. These countries want India to reduce its sugar subsidies to farmers to further their own exports in Indian markets. In addition, India being a part of RCEP would have meant increased chances of dumping of spices, mainly, pepper and cardamom from South Asian spice majors. Further, tea and coffee planters face increased competition from China and Vietnam and Indonesia. To this end, its looks wise decision by Indian PM not to join RCEP as any India’s commitment on market access under the RCEP could have provided an additional opportunity to member countries to exploit Indian farmers and markets.

Another group of stakeholders in India’s RCEP deal are diary producers who face tough competition from New Zealand’s and Australia’s diary industry which are huge exporters of milk and milk products globally. As its milk producers are more efficient than India’s small producers, any increased market access given to New Zealand’s producers for their dairy product would hamper India’s interests. According to latest estimates, New Zealand is the main exporter of milk worldwide with an export value of $6.3 billion in 2019. 

Threat to manufacturing sector and “Make in India”

Another reason for India pulling out of RCEP was that China would have had to be given similar levels of market access and preferential tariff treatment. This has made India’s manufacturing sector uncomfortable which faces increasing competition from cheap Chinese products, especially in electronic items. China’s presence in RCEP is a potential threat to “Make in India” initiative too. Recent data shows that India imported electronic components worth Rs 1.15 lakh crore in 2019-20, out of which, 37% came from China alone.

India’s aluminium and copper industries are already facing tough completion from China and if import tariffs are further cut under RCEP, it will cause severe damage to domestic aluminium industry which serves as major input in various production chains. The latest government data shows that India imported around $4.4 billion worth of aluminium in 2019-20, out of which China was the biggest supplier, shipping aluminium worth over $1 billion. Further, talking about the copper industry, China, Japan, Malaysia, Vietnam and Thailand are the RCEP nations which have emerged as the major exporters of copper, accounting for 45% of India's $5 billion in copper imports for 2019-20.

Stringent Rules of origin (ROO) to ensure precise tariff differentiation and prevent routing through other countries, especially China

As India already has trade deficit with 11 RCEP members, India had sought strict rules of origin to determine the source country of a product and to ensure that Chinese goods are not repackaged and routed to India through member countries that may have lower or no duty. For example, Chinese garments enter Indian markets through duty-free route under SAFTA pact and Duty Free access from Bangladesh. However, most of the participant countries want lenient rules of origin, especially the smaller countries like Vietnam or Philippines, since they don’t possess resources or manufacturing capacities to ensure large scale value addition and exports. Except the countries such as China or Japan, which has large scale manufacturing capacities, most of the countries are small and want lenient rules of origin.

India has asked for “sufficient value addition” of at least 35% in the country of exports for a product to be eligible for its tariff concession under RCEP. However, member nations are not comfortable with this proposal and want to settle for just minimal value addition. For example, a mobile phone manufactured in China, that is excluded from the list of Chinese products eligible for duty concession in India can still find its place in Indian market through Vietnam because the phone is part of India’s offer list for Vietnam. This is despite the fact that the entire mobile phone is made in China but only a tempered glass is put on a Chinese phone in Vietnam and then exported to India at zero or lower duty. It is in this light, that most experts are asserting that 35%, value addition clause will be the toughest proposals for countries like China to agree.

Further, upon India’s insistence on the 35% value addition clause in the RCEP agreement, other member nations wanted to limit the list of tariff lines where such a level of value addition would be mandatory to just 100. However, India rejected such a short list.

Exclusion from Most Favoured Nation (MFN) obligations in Investment Chapter 

India provides Most Favoured Nation treatment to its strategic allies or for geopolitical reasons. However, MFN clause under RCEP agreement would have meant that India would be forced to give similar benefits to all RCEP countries that it gave to its allies. However, India wanted to exclude MFN obligations from investment chapter as India didn’t want to provide same preferential treatment to all RCEP countries, especially China with which India has large trade deficits and border disputes.

Refusal to “Automatic trigger safeguards mechanism” (ATSM)   

To prevent dumping and to check a sudden surge in imports from partner countries, especially from China, Austria, and New Zealand, under RCEP negotiations, India had demanded an “auto-trigger” mechanism to allow it to raise tariffs on products if imports cross a certain threshold. However, the move was resisted by most of the member nations.

 

Apprehensions in Trade in services specifically easing movement of professionals under MODE 4 of GATT

As India enjoys comparative advantage in trade in services, especially under Mode 4, India had long pushed for to greater movement of professionals and workers into their market in return for greater access in goods trade. But here also, India faced resistance from small countries such as Singapore, New Zealand and Brunei. However, this time under RCEP negotiations, India took a firm stand that it doesn’t make sense to have an agreement in goods without anything substantial easing in trade in services.

Concerns over using base year before 2014 for tariff reduction

Another concern for India was regarding its demand over the use of base year for tariff reduction. Majority of the member nations wanted tariff reduction to happen from the rates prevalent in 2013, i.e. from the year when the RCEP negotiations started. However, to provide protection to its domestic industry, India had sought to use base year for tariff reductions after 2014. As India, under its “Make in India” initiative, in the 5-year span of 2014-19, had raised import duties on several thousand products, thus, using a base year before 2014 would mean a drastic drop in duties on the imported products, and thus would prove disastrous for domestic manufacturers. Thus, India wants to change the base year applied to tariff reductions under RECEP FTA to 2019.

Conclusion: Looking for Alternative to Protectionism

In conclusion, it can be said that these protectionist policies are unsustainable in the long run; rather India should focus on export promotion strategies and diversification of the export markets to tap the growing markets of Africa and Latin America, to which its exports are comparatively less. Strengthening of MSME sector for export promotion and technological upgradtion and ease of doing business to improve their competitiveness is another prerequisite for creating globally competitive sectors, going forward.

 

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

Difficult times ahead! Is government worried about this untamed inflation?

Recent data released by the Ministry of Statistics & Programme Implementation (MoSPI) on India’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) showed that retail inflation eased a little to 6.44 percent in February from a high of 6.52 per cent in January. However, this decrease can’t be treated as a breather as retail inflation still remains above the RBI’s tolerance limit of 6%. Last month only RBI raised its repo rate by 25 basis points to 6.5% from 6.25%. This was the   sixth time when repo rate was raised by RBI since May last year, taking the total hike to 250 basis points with the latest increase. These repo rate hikes fiercely burden the borrowers. Any Increase in the repo rate makes the borrowing expensive for the banks, which then pass this raised borrowing cost to customers in form of higher interest rates on retail loans such as home, car, and personal loans which manifest itself in form of elevated monthly EMI burden on consumers. Policy rate hikes also hamper the growth concerns in...

How will the recovery path look like after Covid-19 crisis in India?

While the Indian economy has been hit really hard by the corona crisis, economists are tossing on the shape that recovery path would follow. With lockdown getting stretched in phases, economists are predicting beyond traditional V, U, W, and L-shaped recession towards more of a “Nike swoosh” recovery trail. As time is passing, the coronavirus crisis is proving to be an unwanted sequel to 1930’s Great depression, with its consequential economic devastation exceeding that of 2008 Great recession. With Government getting more optimistic towards lifting up of lockdown, economists are busy speculating the shape of the recession and the plausible recovery out of it. In the initial phases of lockdown, it was V shaped recession that was getting popular among economists; however, with this covid-19 crisis getting stretched, majority of economist now are hinting more towards a Nike swoosh shaped recovery. Let’s analyse some of the famous recovery patterns on which economists are tossing upon. ...

Reviving the true spirit of federalism in India

Reviving the true spirit of federalism in India: Need for greater decentralisation of power and financial empowerment of states to tackle Covid-19 While States in India have taken a leading role in managing Covid-19 pandemic, federal restrictions prove to be stumbling blocks. Central government should see this pandemic as an opportunity to reaffirm federal spirit through creation of a greater “fiscal space” for states and by reducing their borrowing costs. The experience from the last one month in the way states are handling the pandemic clearly indicates that they are truly “ laboratories of democracy ” as paraphrased by former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis.   However, the constitutionally defined federalism in India is “quasi federal” in nature with a strong unitary bias. T he distribution of executive and legislative powers between Centre and States clearly indicates existence of “asymmetry” in the way Indian federalism works. The actions of the central g...